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Abstract 
This note characterizes the dynamic structure of stable matchings of the stable marriage problem (SMP). The 
characterization focuses on the dynamic process of how the stable matching will be attained. To this end, the discrete 
problem of the SMP will be mapped to nonlinear dynamical models whose attractors include the counterparts of the stable 
matchings in the original SMP. A simple measure of decision-making difficulty is introduced. We use two types of 
diagram: a cross section diagram (and its 3D imaging) of a lattice to visualize the decision-making difficulty, and a 
radiation diagram to visualize the time evolution to a matching. Both diagrams are used to examine the dynamic structure of 
the neighborhood of an attractor and its basin as well as the region between basins in the dynamical model mapped from the 
SMP. 
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1. Introduction 
Mapping discrete problems to continuous dynamical models often gives an insight on the original discrete 
problem. We have been studying matching problems such as the stable marriage problem (SMP) [3, 4, 9, 11], 
the stable roommate problem (SRP) [7], and an assignment problem by mapping them to dynamical models 
such as a self-recognition model (SRM) [8] and the Lotka-Volterra model [5]. This note focuses on the 
difficulty in decision-making in relation to symmetries of preference structure. The difficulty in decision-
making falls into two categories: a local one and a global (or structural) one. The local category can be further 
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divided into intra-agent and inter-agent cases; in the intra-agent case such as the marriage problem, a man 
cannot decide in his mind which woman he likes more, while in the inter-agent case a man is liked and ranked 
in the same order by two women. In both cases, we need a tie break. The intra-agent difficulty is intrinsically 
local, whereas the inter-agent difficulty can be global if the number of agents involved becomes larger.  
We often experience difficulty in making decisions not only when the options are complicated but also when 
the options are symmetric and cannot be distinguished from each other. We will focus on the latter difficulty, 
that is, the difficulty due to symmetry. On the one hand, in a discrete problem of the stable marriage problem 
(SMP), more-stable matchings emerge the more symmetric the preferences are. On the other hand, in the 
mapped dynamical model, the computational time required to reach the corresponding attractors increases as 
the model structures become more symmetric.  
From the viewpoint of game theory, a mechanism design [10] and strategic questions [11] on matching 
problems are important but difficult problems. The present work focuses on the decision-making process of 
matching problems by investigating the dynamics of dynamical models mapped from the matching problems. 
This requires a detailed investigation on the stable manifold of the dynamical model, which in turn requires 
new diagrams and visualization techniques. This note uses the self-recognition model (SRM) [8] as a 
dynamical model. 
Section 2 briefly explains both matching problems and dynamical models. The mapping framework is also 
presented with an example from the SMP to the SRM. Section 3 defines a measure of difficulty in decision-
making. Two diagrams are also introduced to examine the global and local dynamics. Not only the 
correspondence between stable matchings in the SMP and attractors in the SRM, but also the correspondence 
between decision-making difficulty in the SMP due to symmetry and the border between basins in the SRM are 
presented. 
 
Nomenclature 
SMP stable marriage problem  
SRP stable roommate problem 
SRM self-recognition model 
2. Mapping Matching Problems to Dynamical Models 
2.1 Matching Problems 
This section introduces matching problems by presenting a naïve matching problem: the stable roommates 
problem (SRP) [7]. The SRP assumes 2N participants {pi: i = 1…2N}, each of whom has a strict (without tie) 
ordered preference over the other 2N-1 participants. The SRP seeks complete matching consisting of N pairs 
without being blocked. A matching is said to be blocked if a participant pi prefers a participant pj (i ≠ j) to the 
current roommate in the matching and that preferred participant pj also prefers pi to the current partner in the 
matching. The pair (pi , pj) is called a blocking pair.  
The stable marriage problem (SMP) [4, 11] assumes N women {wi: i = 1…N} and N men {mi: i = 1…N}, 
each of whom has a strict (without tie) ordered preference (rank) over the opposite sex. In contrast to the SRP, 
the SMP seeks complete matching between women and men without being blocked.  
As in the example shown in Fig. 1, the man m2 has a preference (w1w3w2), which means that m2 likes w1 best, 
and prefers w1 to w3, and w3 to w2. 
The preference of each agent is also expressed by a preference matrix {aij} where the element aij in the ith 
row and jth column is defined to be R(mi, wj)/R(wj, mi) where R(mi, wj) is the rank of mi to wj. In the left part of 
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Table 1, for example, a11 = R(m1, w1)/R(w1, m1) = 2/1 indicates that the man m1 likes the woman w1 second-best 
while the woman w1 likes the man m1 best. Figure 1 depicts a bipartite graph indicating one matching: {(m1, 
w3), (m2, w2), (m3, w1)}, while the preference (rank) of each person is indicated besides the nodes representing 
the person. In the matching, the persons such as m2 and w3 could be happier otherwise: (m2, w3). Hence, the pair 
(m2, w3) blocks the current matching as in Fig. 1. This means that the matching {(m1, w3), (m2, w2), (m3, w1)} is 
not stable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To visualize the global structure of all the matchings in an SMP instance, we used a diagram [8] (named 
affinity space diagram) similar to a phase space diagram which is often drawn for the continuous dynamical 
model. Affinity is used as a conventional measure of the happiness (happiness can not be measured, of course) 
of a person in a pair. A(mi, wj) is the man mi’s affinity for the woman wj, and A(wj, mi) is the woman wj’s 
affinity for the man mi. The affinity matrix is also defined by the preference matrix as: A(mi, wj) = N + 1 − 
R(mi, wj), varying from N to 1 as the preference (rank) changes from 1 to N. The right part of Table 1 shows the 
affinity matrix corresponding to the preference matrix in the left part of Table 1. In the affinity space diagram, 
the following total affinity for women and men is used to arrange all the possible matchings μ in two-
dimensional coordinates:  
 ¦

 
P
P
),(
),,()(
ij mw
ijw mwAH  ¦

 
P
P
),(
),()(
ij mw
jim wmAH  
where women’s total affinity Hw is plotted on the vertical axis and men’s total affinity Hm on the horizontal axis  
(shown as Fig. 2 (a)). 
 w1 w2 w3 
m1 2/1 3/1 1/3 
m2 1/3 3/2 2/2 
m3 2/2 1/3 3/1 
 w1 w2 w3 
m1 2/3 1/3 3/1 
m2 3/1 1/2 2/2 
m3 2/2 3/1 1/3 
Fig. 1. An example of the SMP instance specified by ordered 
preferences of men (left) and women (right) over the member of the 
opposite sex. A bipartite graph shows a matching of the SMP 
consisting of three pairs.   
m1 w1 
m3 w3 
Matching 
 (3 Pairs) 
 
w3w1w2  
w1w3w2  
w2w1w3  
m1m3m2  
m1m2m3  
m3m2m1  
m2 w2 
Preference Men Women Preference 
Blocking 
Pair 
Table 1.  Preference matrix (left) and its affinity matrix (right) of an instance of 
the SMP with three stable matchings: man-optimal {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)};  
{(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)}; woman-optimal {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}.  
675 Yoshiteru Ishida and Takumi Sato /  Procedia Computer Science  22 ( 2013 )  672 – 679 
2.2. Dynamical Models as Problem-Solving Mechanism 
Dynamical models, when mapped properly from discrete problems, allow us to focus on the dynamics of the 
original problem, which could not be analyzed within a discrete problem setting.  
First, the solutions of the original problem must be mapped to attractors of the dynamical model, so that the 
time evolution will permit the model to solve the original problem. The constraints and assumptions of the 
original problem should be properly reflected in the dynamical models. This way of mapping is a standard and 
natural way of mapping, as can be found, for example, in DNA computing [1] and Hopfield Network [6] in 
solving the combinatorial problem of the traveling salesman problem (TSP).  
Second, time dependent variables of the dynamical models should be designed in an appropriate level of 
granularity consistent with the original problem. In matching problems such as the SMP and SRP, for example, 
the time dependent variables would be those representing pairs (or matchings) where a full selection of a pair 
(or a matching) may be normalized as the value 1 and a full exclusion as the value 0 of the variable.  
Third, the initial value setting in the mapped dynamical model can play a significant role in studying the 
dynamic process of the original problem. Again, in matching problems for example, the initial value setting can 
be used to represent active agents (proposing agents in the SMP) as well as to set an initial matching (or initial 
pairing) to observe which stable matching will be eventually selected and how it will be selected. It will be 
revealed that the initial value in the region between two basins corresponds to impossible situations in decision-
making due to symmetry and because of the definition of basins. 
2.3. Example of Mapped Dynamical Model 
The SMP has been mapped to dynamical models such as self-recognition models (or mutual recognition 
networks) [8] and generalized Lotka-Volterra models [5]. In both types of mapping, a pair is expressed as a 
time dependent variable varying from 0 (full exclusion of the pair from a matching) to 1 (full inclusion of the 
pair in a matching). Let us concentrate on the mapping to the self-recognition model. The self-recognition 
model uses the time dependent variables ri(t) and their normalized ones Ri(t):  
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The parameter Tij = 1 (-1) when the variable Ri is designed to stimulate (inhibit) Rj, and Tji = 0 otherwise (no 
interactions). Inhibitions are used to exclude violations of the assumptions in the SRM such as one man and 
one woman must be paired; and to exclude unstable matchings by inhibiting variables corresponding to 
blocking pairs. Figure 2 shows an example of the SRM mapped from an instance of the SMP shown in Table 1. 
In the phase space of the dynamical model, attractors correspond to stable matchings and a basin of the 
attractor to initial settings from which the decision will be attracted to the stable matching corresponding to the 
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attractor. However, there can be cases in which some attractors do not correspond to any stable matching, 
depending on the mapping and the dynamical model. Also, a border between basins specifies the initial values 
from which a decision on any matching is impossible.  
 
3. Asymmetric Characterization of a Lattice formed by Stable Matchings 
3.1 Difficulty in Decision-Making due to Symmetry 
We experience difficulty in decision-making when the available options are symmetric (including no 
information at all) and choosing one option makes no difference from not choosing any option. In conducting 
computer simulations to investigate the correspondence between stable matchings and attractors, we observed 
that simulations starting from certain initial values did not terminate or took a huge number of simulation steps. 
We assume that similar situations in terms of symmetry occur for a computer (a simulator).  
The dynamical model as a problem-solving mechanism of the original SMP can provide not only solutions 
(as attractors) but also dynamics of how a certain matching can be attained, or not attained, depending on the 
initial point from which the simulation started. Thus, stable matchings correspond to attractors, and impossible 
decision-making corresponds to a border between the basins of the attractors. Symmetry breaking (a tie-break) 
is required in order to decide a matching. 
3.2. Diagrams to Investigate Global and Local Symmetry 
Since difficulty in decision-making depends on symmetry, we used several diagrams to observe the 
symmetry. Figure 3 (a) is an affinity space diagram [8], which amounts to a lattice of matchings placed in a 
Fig. 2. An example of the SRM mapped from an instance of the SMP 
shown in Table 1. There are nine nodes corresponding to nine possible 
pairs. The plus (minus) sign from a node i to a node j indicates Tij = 1 (-1).㻌
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coordinate of the affinity. Each node of the lattice represents a matching consisting of three woman-man pairs 
where women’s total affinity is used for the horizontal axis and men’s total affinity for the vertical axis in 
placing the node. A straightforward way to observe decision-making is to measure the computational time 
required to reach the attractor. Figure 3 (b) shows the number of simulation steps required to reach the 
attractors. Figure 4 shows the number of simulation steps, indicated by the color gradation in the 2D diagram in 
(a), and by the height in the 3D diagram in (b). Because we can measure the required steps from any initial 
values, the diagrams shown in Figs. 4 (a) (b) may be analogically regarded as an “MRI” of the lattice by 
focusing on the preference of only man (vertical axis) and that of only woman (horizontal axis). The diagrams 
show that there is a border between basins where the required number of simulation steps starting from the 
border is huge, indicating that decisions starting from these initial values are very difficult or even impossible 
to make due to the symmetric structure. Figure 3 (b) shows a cross section along the line from the bottom-right 
corner to the top-left corner in Fig. 4 (a). Figures 4 (a) and (b) indicate that decisions close to the origin are also 
difficult to make.  
 
 
 
(a)                                                                     (b) 
Fig. 4. Diagrams showing the number of simulation steps required to reach attractors. The required 
time step is indicated by color gradation in 2D in (a), and by height in 3D in (b). Three attractors 
(valleys) as well as two border lines between attractors (hills) can be observed. Note that decision-
making becomes more difficult closer to the origin (point of no information in the initial value).  
Hw 
Hm (a)                                                                       (b) 
Fig. 3. (a) Affinity space diagram showing matchings as nodes in a coordinate of the women’s total 
affinity Hw (men’s total affinity Hm) on the vertical (horizontal) axis; (b) cross section diagram, with 
the number of simulation steps used plotted on the vertical axis and initial value setting on the 
horizontal axis ranging from 0 (woman-optimal) to 1 (man-optimal). Three valleys are attractors 
corresponding to woman-optimal stable matching (left), man-optimal stable matching (right) and 
third stable matching (middle). The two peaks indicate impossible decisions starting from a border 
between two basins.  
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Figure 5 shows time evolutions of the normalized variables Ri(t) for every pair. These radiation diagrams can 
reveal local symmetry among pairs within a diagram as well as among matchings between diagrams. Within a 
diagram, it can be seen that decisions for one matching will be done synchronously and abruptly in the course 
of decision-making among promising pairs. Thus, for the decision-making in matching problems, decisions can 
be easier to make with more pairs in a synchronous fashion. It may be tempting to explain this synchronous 
phenomenon as “June bride”. Between diagrams, an exchange symmetry can be observed between the woman-
optimal matching (Fig. 5 (a)) and the man-optimal matching (Fig. 5 (c)). 
3.3. Correspondence between Stable Matchings and Attractors 
By mapping the SMP to dynamical models, a correspondence between stable matchings in the SMP and 
attractors in the dynamical models has been studied. Since the mapping has not yet been examined 
exhaustively, we do not yet know whether every stable matching has its counterpart of attractors, nor whether 
distinct stable matchings are mapped to distinct attractors. However, we can show that there can be invariant 
sets that do not have corresponding stable matchings. Our mapping scheme indicates that symmetric structures 
in the preference matrix will be reflected on the symmetric structures of the dynamical models mapped. Thus, a 
symmetric structure such as a Latin SMP [2] will be mapped to the dynamical model exhibiting symmetric 
structure where variables cannot be distinguished. Hence, the model with an equal initial value assigned to all 
the variables will evolve to the equal value of all the variables afterward, forming an invariant set consisting of 
points with equal values of variables. In the SRM, the origin where all the variables are 0 is a fixed point. 
This fact indicates that the algorithms for solving the SMP such as the Gale and Shapley (GS) algorithm [3] 
involve asymmetry in the process of solving. The GS algorithm, for example, has the temporal asymmetry 
(asynchronous) that some pairing must be formed in the first place even though all the members are under the 
symmetric situation as far as their own preference and others’ preferences are concerned. To reflect such 
asymmetry in the process of problem-solving in the trajectory of dynamical models, initial values for the 
dynamical model must be asymmetric, avoiding the fixed points and the invariant set mentioned above. 
(a)                                                                (b)                                                                     (c)               
Fig. 5. Radiation diagrams indicating the time evolution of every pair. Time evolves from the center to the perimeter of 
each circle. The thicker (thinner) the profile, the closer to the highest value of 1 (lowest value of 0). (a), (b) and (c) show 
time evolutions starting from different initial values: (a) from the basin of woman-optimal matching; (b) from the basin of  
the matching {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)}; (c) from the basin of man-optimal matching. Time evolutions of every pair 
from (m1, w1) to (m3, w3) are placed in a counterclockwise direction and separated by broken lines radiating at every 30 
degrees. For example, (a) indicates the evolution to the woman-optimal matching {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}. 
m1w2㻌m1w3㻌 m1w2㻌m1w3㻌 m1w2㻌m1w3㻌
m1w1 
m3w3 
m3w2 
m3w1 
m2w3 
m2w2 
m2w1 
m1w1 m2w1 
m2w2 
m2w3 
m3w1 m3w2 
m3w3 
m1w1 m2w1 
m2w2 
m2w3 
m3w1 
m3w2 
m3w3 
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4. Conclusion 
We have shown the detailed dynamics of how a matching will be attained, switched to another matching, or 
is difficult to attain by mapping the stable marriage problem to a dynamical model. It was also demonstrated 
that the static structure of a lattice formed by matchings including stable ones can be captured as a stable 
manifold that includes detailed information of the dynamic structure. Difficulty in decision-making reflecting 
symmetric structure can be measured by the number of simulation steps required. This type of analysis can 
shed light on the dynamic process of how matchings are attained. New types of diagrams may also play a role 
in revealing the spatio-temporal pattern of tightly coupled multiple variables. 
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